One issue raised by proponents of the so-called independent state legislature theory is the extent to which state courts can use state constitutional requirements to strike down state laws affecting federal elections. According to one proposed application of the theory, state courts can never subject such laws to constitutional judicial review. According to another motion, federal courts can largely, but not always, prevent state courts from using state constitutions to strike down state laws. This article assesses whether any of these positions are consistent with the original meaning of the Constitution. Since the article focuses on the originalist methodology, it draws attention only to the text of the Constitution and the context in which this text was written and evaluated in 1787 and 1788. This examination of the relevant text and the history of the framing era – especially since this history is exposed by the Federalist Papers – casts a long shadow over the theory of independent state legislation. At the very least, it suggests that, as an originist issue, there is no solid basis for broadly empowering federal courts to restrict judicial review of federal election laws under state constitutions, let alone prevent such judicial review. Few problems in a divorce can be as emotionally charged or have long-term consequences as the disputes over embryo control that a couple created and cryopreserved during their marriage. Most of the men in this scenario, who are still able to have children naturally, have tried to prevent their ex-wives from having a child they no longer want. For many women, however, embryos reflect their best and perhaps the only chance to have a child. Interests could not be more polar, but there can be no common ground – the interests of one party must give way to the other. To date, the appellate courts of one-third of the states have addressed this issue and have overwhelmingly sided with the party that wants to avoid parenthood and have explicitly adopted a presumption against the use of embryos.
Only twice in nineteen cases has a court granted the embryos to the party who wants to use them. Although gender-neutral on its face, the effect of this presumption has disproportionately favoured men. The courts have prioritized men`s interests by avoiding the purely cognitive burdens of genetic parenting, even when they are exempt from legal parenting responsibility, over women`s interests and investment in genetics, pregnancy and legal parenting. This article reviews previous arguments by courts and scientists in support of the presumption and rejects the fact that the results simply reflect inherent biological differences between the sexes. Rather, the article analyzes the decisions of the 125 judges who have now ruled on this issue, reveals a clear difference in the outcome based on the judge`s gender, and argues that the prevailing presumption against use reflects an implicit gender bias among judges. In this way, the article positions this issue as the latest in a long line of male-centered approaches in U.S. law of reproductive rights, autonomy, and parental duties. As these cases are sure to increase in the coming years, this article aims to raise awareness among judges and legislators in most states that still face the problem and to move the law towards a real balance of interests of both parties. At the beginning of the first year of law school, students will likely realize that facts are crucial. But the law school curriculum is designed in such a way that the process of establishing legal facts becomes almost invisible.
Traditional first-year courses focus on appellate cases and legal norms. The facts are there. The standards of appellate review largely isolate the factual finding of trial courts from review by appellate courts. And casebooks focus on legal rules, largely excluding cases that focus on the factual process. The law school`s primary course, which emphasizes fact-finding, is evidence, but in many versions of this course, the focus on issues of admissibility of evidence is not on trials in which jurors and judges move from evidence to findings of fact. On March 2, 2022, in response to vicious and anti-Western narratives surrounding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Council of the European Union legally banned two state-sponsored Russian media outlets, RT and Sputnik, within the EU`s borders. The Council`s decision is divided. Although the ban limits the reach of these Russian “organs of influence”, it also violates fundamental human rights within the EU.
It is therefore worth examining whether the benefits of banning the Kremlin`s antagonistic narrative are worth the sacrifice of undermining the fundamental principles of democracy. To what extent is the prohibition proportionate or necessary? This article examines these issues from a psychological and legal perspective. He argues that, although the decision to ban RT and Sputnik is legally sound, the reasoning of the decision would benefit from a more detailed explanation of the balance between the different (conflicting) fundamental rights, not least because the disruptive effect of the RT and Sputnik narratives is unclear. Moreover, instead of a blanket ban, a less strict and more nuanced approach might be more appropriate, allowing RT and Sputnik to be sanctioned appropriately while remaining proportionate and mitigating a possible feedback effect. This article argues that the commemoration of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) should take into account the role it has played in promoting and countering racial justice, as well as the role that racial justice advocates have played in shaping its interpretation. The APA was not intended to promote racial justice; Indeed, its provisions isolated some of the most racist policies of the mid-twentieth century from challenges. Yet proponents of racial justice have long understood that administrative agencies can be a necessary or even particularly receptive target to their efforts, and the APA has shaped these calculations. Along the way, proponents of racial justice have left their mark on administrative law, including an underestimated role in the participatory turn of administrative law. A better understanding of the interplay between racial justice and administrative procedures, in my view, would be beneficial for historical and legal research on race, administrative law and their many little-studied but important overlaps. If a legal text is vague, overtly structured, irreducibly ambiguous, has gaps or contradictions, it creates a “building zone”. The legal effect of the constitutional clause, legal provisions or contractual clause will subdetermine their legal effect. In this area of underdetermination, interpretation will be necessary to determine the legal content and application to certain cases.
In other words, underdetermination creates building areas. Of course, judges disagree on which second-rate legal theories are best. Some judges are legal textualists, but others believe they are bound by legislative intent; Still others are trying to discover the objective objective of the Statute. In addition, there are judges who are pragmatic or pluralistic with respect to the interpretation of the law. In other words, the question of which second-order theory of interpretation and construction of law is best is itself a controversial question of legal theory. The same is true for second-order theories of common law and constitutional interpretation and interpretation. In recent years, the term “judicial deference” has appeared most often in relation to the “chevron doctrine,” which deals with the judicial consideration of regulatory interpretations of regulatory statutes. The basic idea of chevron deference is that courts should bow to the agency`s interpretation of the law if the law is unclear (“ambiguous”) and the agency`s interpretation is reasonable.
