See, for example, Dubose v State, 662 So.2d 1189 (Ala. 1995) (it is a breach of due process not to provide an expert “to rebut the testimony of Lifecodes witnesses. to test the samples independently, to consider whether the DNA results have indeed shown a match, or to declare that scientific opinions can be shared”); Cade v State, 658 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995) (trial court abused its discretion under state law by rejecting the defence`s request to appoint a DNA expert, although no specific need was demonstrated, but only the general remark that “I can`t tell the court what I`m looking for because it`s so complicated”), rev. denied, 663 So. 2d 631 (fla. 1995); Husske v Commonwealth, 448 p.E.2d 331, 335 (Va.
ct. App. 1994) (depending on the importance of the scientific issue in the case and the help a defence expert could have provided; it is a mistake not to provide an expert to challenge the numbers and claims of a population geneticist). Finally, in the variable-prior-odds method, an expert does not use his own prior ratings, nor does he require judges to formulate their previous odds for substitution in Bayes` rule. However, deciding whether quantitative estimates should be submitted to a jury is another matter. Once science has determined that a methodology has some individualizing power, the legal system must determine whether and how best to import that technology into the experimental process (Kaye, 1995, pp. 104-105). If the results are sufficiently conclusive to be admissible, conceivable alternatives for making statements about the subsequent likelihood that the accused is the source of the probative DNA (see Chapter 5), ranging from qualitative characterization of that probability to calculation of the probability ratio for the assumption that the defendant is the source, qualitative statements of this standard for the strength of evidence. currently dominant estimates of profile frequencies or random probabilities, simple ratios of a match. See, for example, Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (Ind.
1995) (“The words “DNA test results” are not magic words that, once uttered, open the doors to eligibility. »); State v Russell, 125 Wash.2d 570, 882 P.2d 747 (1995) (“The question in this case is therefore not whether the underlying theory of DNA testing is generally accepted, but whether PCR is generally accepted.”); State v. Grayson, No. K2-94-1298, 1994 WL 670312 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 8 Nov. 1994) (although RFLP tests are accepted in Minnesota, court reconsidered PCR-based tests according to the Frye standard). Therefore, court opinions on the admissibility of PCR-based evidence shed light on the procedures used by judges to determine the validity of a new DNA technology and clarify some of the legal issues raised by the PCR method of DNA typing. See, for example, State v Gentry, 125 Wash.2d 570, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995) (1995) (6-week Frye hearing).
(iv) Once the results of a review have been communicated to the parties, the applicant should be allowed to request a second hearing to determine what remedial measures, if any, are appropriate. and As soon as two samples present similar profiles, the question arises as to what, if anything, can be told to the trier of fact about the significance of that conclusion. Before forensic experts can conclude that DNA testing has the ability to identify the source of a sample of evidence, it must be shown that DNA traits vary from person to person. Therefore, it would not be scientifically justifiable to speak of a match as proof of identity in the absence of underlying data allowing a reasonable estimate of the true rarity of matching characteristics. In federal courts, Rule 16 (a) (l) (C) of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure, which permits inspection of physical items in State possession at the request of the defendant, has been interpreted as prescribing the right of a defendant to test or retest a sample under government control. See, for example, United States v Butler, 988 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1993) (cocaine), cert. denied, 114 p.ct. 413 (1993). Similarly, some States interpret the rules of application of the law of their jurisdiction as requiring review (Note 1984). Other states have laws or regulations that specifically provide for the review of physical evidence. See, for example, Iowa Code Ann.
§ 813.2, R. 13(2)(b)(1) (1979); The. Crim code. Part 71 (West 1981); State v Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989) (citing a Minnesota Code of Criminal Procedure, which grants defense attorney the right to “all results of. scientific tests, experiments or comparisons related to the particular case” to conclude that, to the extent possible, “an accused should receive the actual DNA sample(s) to reproduce the tests”). In addition, some authorities support a constitutional right to review arising from the requirement of due process. See, for example, Moore v State, 748 P.2d 732, 735 (Ok. Crim. App. 1987) (The Oklahoma Constitution requires the state to give the defendant an opportunity to re-examine and retest them, unless the sample has been consumed by government authorities; illegal substance); State v Thomas, 421 S.E.2d 227, 234 (W.Va.
1992) (if the prosecution conducts a test, such as an electrophoretic blood test, that consumes the sample to be analyzed, the state must “keep as much documentation of the test as reasonably possible to permit full and fair examination of the results by a defendant and his experts”). Other dishes, though. concluded that, even if a new hearing was denied, the right to cross-examine the prosecutor`s expert provided the accused with sufficient protection. See, for example, Frias/State, 547 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ind. 1989) (cocaine), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 921 (1990); People v. Bell, 253 N.W.2d 726.729 (1977); Montoya (1995). Although scientists have proposed promising ways to present probabilistic assessments in the courtroom (Finkelstein & Fairley, 1970; suggest that jurors receive a set of plausible prior probabilities and information about what the probability ratio implies for the evidence given these previous probabilities), there is still almost no empirical evidence of the effects of these probabilities).
Presentation to decision-makers. While some basic probability concepts can be taught to students in half an hour with some success (Fong et al. 1986), research is needed on the appropriate way to adequately inform jurors of the more sophisticated probabilistic concepts involved when DNA evidence is presented at trial. If tribunals are to make informed decisions on authorized or privileged expert submissions, further research is needed on alternative methods of presenting processes. After the publication of the 1992 report, commentators pointed to “a third wave of cases. crash on this battered legal coast” (Kaye, 1993, p. 103). These cases focused less on laboratory methods to characterize and match DNA than on statistical methods to interpret the significance of similarities in DNA samples. Many opinions during this period lagged behind the scientific literature, which responded insistently to early speculation and dubious analyses about the significance of deviations from assumptions of statistical independence of alleles within and between VNTR loci.
In fact, some courts have held that the evolution of scientific opinion under Frye was essentially irrelevant as long as respected scientists continued to oppose statistical methods. For example, People v Wallace, 14 Cal. App. 4th 651, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (1993). Although LRs are rarely introduced in criminal cases,97 we believe that they are appropriate to explain the significance of the data and that existing statistical knowledge is sufficient to allow their calculation. None of the RLs developed for VNTRs can be dismissed as patently unreasonable or based on principles that are not generally accepted in the statistical community. Therefore, legal doctrine suggests that RLs should be admissible unless they are so incomprehensible that they do not provide jury support, or so misleading as to be unduly disadvantageous. As with frequencies and probabilities of agreement, there could be bias because the proposed RLs do not account for laboratory errors, and a jury might even misunderstand a modified version that would consider this a statement of opportunity in favor of S.
